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INTRODUCTION
Every Sunday Catholics across the globe gather together in their parish
churches to celebrate Mass. For many parishioners, this is a time for prayer,
reflection, and community. For a teenage girl in Clinton, Louisiana, however,
attending Mass became a living nightmare. Sitting in a pew nearby was the
man who allegedly had been sexually harassing and abusing her for an entire
summer.1 Sitting next to her were her unsuspecting parents, whom she feared
to tell about the abuse.2 Standing on the altar was the priest to whom she
had confessed the alleged series of abusive acts.3 The purported
relationship between the girl and her abuser started innocently enough; she
claimed that the man would send her emails regularly with inspirational
religious verses. Harmless electronic communication reportedly escalated
Copyright 2017, by CAROLINE DONZE.
1. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177, 1178 (La. 2014).
2. Id. at 1178–79.
3. Id.
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to grossly inappropriate physical contact, including kissing and groping,
and the man expressing his desire to have sexual intercourse with her.4
The girl communicated to her priest everything the man allegedly did to
her. She may have expected that the leader of the tight-knit church community
would help her achieve the goal she could not accomplish alone: confronting
her parents and abuser and revealing the secrets she had bottled up for so long.
But instead of receiving support and guidance from the priest, he reportedly told
her to deal with the problem herself and refrain from exposing the crimes to
avoid ruining the lives and reputations of her family and abuser.5
The girl’s parents eventually realized their daughter’s secret, but by then
the damage was done. The priest’s failure to report the information supposedly
learned in the confessional reportedly allowed the abuse to continue and
escalate when a simple phone call to mom, dad, or the police would have ended
the nightmare quickly.6 Had the girl confessed to a school teacher or soccer
coach, Louisiana law would have required immediate reporting of the suspected
abuse to law enforcement.7 A teacher or coach would have had to report the
abuse at once because Louisiana has designated teachers and coaches as
mandatory reporters—professionals required by law to report allegations or
suspicions of child abuse immediately to the authorities.8 This girl made her
confession to a Catholic priest during a religious sacrament, however.9 Priests
are also mandatory reporters of child abuse in Louisiana—subject to one major
exception.10 Louisiana, like many other states in this country, exempts clergy
from their ordinary mandate to report if they learn of ongoing or imminent
abuse within the context of a confidential religious communication.11 This
exception stems from the clergy-penitent privilege, which prohibits
compelled disclosure of the contents of private communications between
clergy and their communicants in a judicial proceeding.12

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 724, 726 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
Id.
Id. at 726–27.
LA. CHILD. CODE arts. 603, 609(A)(2) (2017).
Id. arts. 603, 609–10.
Charlet, 135 So. 3d at 1178.
LA. CHILD. CODE art. 603(17)(c).
Id.; CHILDREN’S BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS.,
CLERGY AS MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2016),
https://www.childwelfare.gov/pubPDFs/clergymandated.pdf [https://perma.cc/NG
3B-3JY5].
12. Samuel G. Brooks, Confession and Mandatory Child Abuse Reporting: A
New Take on the Constitutionality of Abrogating the Priest-Penitent Privilege, 24
BYU J. PUB. L. 117, 120 (2009).
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The intersection of mandatory reporting legislation and the clergypenitent privilege illustrates a conflict between the public policy goal of
protecting children and the constitutional right to Free Exercise of religion.13
Though the protection of religious freedom is a cornerstone of the
Constitution, a state may still constitutionally impose burdens on Free
Exercise if some compelling state interest exists to justify the infringement
and if no less restrictive form of regulation is available to achieve the state’s
interest.14 This Comment argues that abrogation of the clergy-penitent
privilege within a state’s mandatory reporting legislation—in the specific
instance where clergy receive confessional reports of ongoing or imminent
child abuse—can withstand constitutional scrutiny. Abrogation of the
privilege is constitutional because the identification and prevention of child
abuse is a compelling state interest and eliminating the privilege in the narrow
circumstance of confessional reports of abuse is the least restrictive means of
carrying out this interest.
Although the objective of protecting child abuse victims from harm
justifies abrogation of the privilege, conflicts posed by the laws of the Catholic
Church nevertheless may hinder the fulfillment of this compelling state
interest. Catholic priests face expulsion from the Church as punishment for
divulging information learned during sacramental confessions.15 Even in the
presence of an unconditional legal mandate to disclose child abuse, priests still
may refuse to report and testify about privileged communications to avoid
their removal from the Church.16
Part I of this Comment examines the history of the clergy-penitent
privilege from its biblical origins to its modern treatment in American courts.
Part II surveys the status of mandatory reporting law in Louisiana and the rest
of the United States, focusing on statutory exceptions for clergy. Part III
explores the constitutional basis for abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege
within mandatory reporting law. Finally, Part IV considers a jurisprudential
example of the negative effects of the privilege on the reporting of child abuse
and contemplates potential avenues for encouraging Catholic priests to report
abuse while still maintaining the integrity of the sacrament of Confession.

13.
14.
15.
16.

See LA. CHILD. CODE art. 601; U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
1983 CODE c.1388, § 1.
See Court May Compel Priest to Break Confessional Seal in Abuse Case,
CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE (July 9, 2014), http://www.catholicnews.com/services
/englishnews/2014/court-may-compel-priest-to-break-confessional-seal-in-abusecase.cfm [https://perma.cc/6L2D-XUDS].
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I. TRACING THE HISTORY OF THE CLERGY-PENITENT PRIVILEGE
The clergy-penitent privilege originated from the Roman Catholic “seal of
confession,” a centuries-old religious doctrine of confidentiality that protects the
sacramental confessions between a priest and his penitent—the sinner seeking
God’s forgiveness for his transgressions.17 Courts in the United States have
acknowledged the importance of safeguarding religious communications.
Likewise, each state legislature has codified some version of the seal of
confession.
A. A Privileged Society: The Benefits of Holding Certain Disclosures
Sacrosanct
Evidentiary privileges reflect the notion that communications within
certain relationships deserve to be kept in confidence.18 Privileges usually
occupy statutory law and typically are based upon public policy goals of
individual states rather than constitutional rights.19 In the judicial system,
privileges hinder the fact-finding process by allowing suppression of
potentially relevant information and testimony; privileges nonetheless persist
in statutory law, which reflects a societal view that the benefits of preserving
confidential relationships sometimes outweigh hindrances to the pursuit of
justice.20 The attorney-client privilege, for example, allows a client complete
and unfettered access to legal counsel with the peace of mind that his lawyer
will not reveal their conversations to third parties.21 Similarly, the spousal
privilege allows a husband to refuse to testify against his wife because the
trust and confidence crucial to preserving the marital relationship would be
destroyed if a court could compel such testimony.22 Finally, a privilege of
confidentiality between clergy and penitent is socially desirable because the
promise of secrecy encourages individuals to seek regular spiritual guidance
from their religious leaders.23
Privileges often have limitations in extraordinary situations. A lawyer’s
ethical duty to prevent reasonably certain death or bodily harm overrides his

17. Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements
Versus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion, 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 735
(1987).
18. Brooks, supra note 12, at 118.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 119.
23. Id.
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ordinary duty of confidentiality to the client.24 Likewise, a mental health
professional may be required to warn third parties if a patient expresses a
desire to inflict violence upon another person.25 The clergy-penitent privilege
contrasts from other evidentiary privileges because confidentiality may be
mandated under religious doctrine, making the privilege absolute even under
exceptional circumstances.26 The clergy-penitent privilege is also unique
among privileges because the receiver of the communication, the clergy
member, potentially may claim protection from compelled disclosure under
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, a defense not available to
a doctor or a lawyer.27
Under evidentiary privileges, “the holder of [the privilege] has the power
to invoke or waive it, either refusing or allowing courts to gain access to
confidential communications.”28 “Ownership” of a privilege typically belongs
to the communicant, not the receiver of the communication.29 For instance,
the attorney-client privilege vests the client with the power to authorize the
disclosure of private communications made within the scope of the legal
relationship.30 Similarly, the doctor-patient privilege allows a patient to waive
confidentiality, thus permitting medical professionals to testify about
information related to that patient’s treatment.31 The clergy-penitent privilege
is unique because a communicant’s waiver of privilege may not be sufficient
for clergy, specifically those of the Catholic faith, to justify revealing the
details of a private confession. A Catholic priest faces possible expulsion from
both his clerical office and the Catholic Church entirely for revealing a private
confession, even if the penitent waives confidentiality.32 The basis for this
harsh punishment arose from the historical evolution of the sacrament of
Confession.33

24. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983).
25. Brooks, supra note 12, at 119.
26. Michael J. Mazza, Should Clergy Hold the Priest-Penitent Privilege?, 82
MARQ. L. REV. 171, 186 (1998).
27. Brooks, supra note 12, at 120.
28. Mazza, supra note 26, at 185.
29. See id.
30. Id.; see also LA. CODE EVID. art. 506 (2017).
31. Mazza, supra note 26, at 185; LA. CODE EVID. art. 511.
32. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1; see discussion infra Part IV.E.1. for a discussion
of the validity of penitent waiver.
33. 1983 CODE c.983, §§ 1–2.
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B. A Catholic Sacrament Forms the Basis for the Clergy-Penitent
Privilege
Confession, known formally as Reconciliation or Penance,34 has a
longstanding tradition in Catholicism dating back to the New Testament
and the life and ministry of Jesus Christ.35 During his public life, Jesus
emphasized forgiveness of sin and the importance of welcoming repentant
sinners back into the church community.36 The Bible recounts the origin
of Confession as a sacramental practice, chronicling how Jesus bestowed the
power of forgiveness upon his apostles, the first priests of the Catholic faith.37
The apostles and the priests who succeeded them subsequently would serve
as “God’s intermediar[ies]” in hearing and forgiving the sins of penitents.38
During the early centuries of Catholicism, the process of receiving
forgiveness for one’s sins was a public affair. Penitents guilty of serious sins
such as adultery or idolatry were required to give their confessions and
perform acts of repentance in front of large crowds.39 Public confession was
a short-lived practice, however. In the seventh century, Catholic missionaries
from Ireland introduced private, confidential confessions into the Catholic
Church in continental Europe after being inspired by practices of Eastern
monastic societies.40 The new approach to Confession was attractive to
penitents because the guarantee of confidentiality encouraged sinners to

34. The sacrament of Reconciliation or Penance is defined in the Code of
Canon Law:
In the sacrament of penance, the faithful who confess their sins to a
legitimate minister, are sorry for them, and intend to reform themselves
obtain from God through the absolution imparted by the same minister
forgiveness for the sins they have committed after baptism and, at the
same, time are reconciled with the Church which they have wounded by
sinning.
1983 CODE c.959.
35. Mazza, supra note 26, at 174.
36. THE ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH, CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH
1443 (1992).
37. John 20:21–23. According to the Gospel of John, when Jesus appeared to
his apostles following his Resurrection, he bequeathed them with the power to
forgive the sins of penitents. Id.
38. Brooks, supra note 12, at 120.
39. See CATECHISM, supra note 36, at 1447; see also Adam Bowers, The Origins
of Mandatory Private Confession in the Catholic Church, QUARTERMASTER OF THE
BAROQUE (Oct. 30, 2013), https://qmbarque.com/2013/10/30/the-origins-of-manda
tory-private-confession-in-the-catholic-church/ [https: //perma.cc/SP3F-DBWE].
40. CATECHISM, supra note 36, at 1447.
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receive the sacrament frequently and without fear of negative public
sentiment.41
Confidential confessions gained widespread acceptance and canon law
eventually incorporated the practice.42 In 1215, the Catholic Church codified
the seal of confession into the Code of Canon Law, imposing a strict obligation
of secrecy upon clergy and a severe penalty for violations of confidentiality, an
obligation that still exists in the present day.43 Under canon law, a priest who
directly violates the seal of confession faces excommunication from the
Church.44 Excommunication is the gravest penalty a member of the Catholic
faith can receive and results in expulsion from the Church and exclusion from
all sacraments.45
Prior to the Protestant Reformation—a movement that involved several
groups breaking off from the Roman Catholic Church to form their own
religious denominations—English law acknowledged the sacred nature of
Confession and did not require priests to breach the sacrament’s requirement
of confidentiality.46 Because many English judges also were members of the
clergy, the law of the Catholic Church heavily influenced the common law.47
In the 16th century, however, the Protestant Reformation reached England,
and the Anglican Church replaced the Catholic Church as the official Church
of England.48 The years that followed saw the deterioration of the confessional
seal in England, as Anglicanism distinguished itself from Catholicism by
placing less emphasis on the importance of visiting the confessional and
making private confessions with a minister an optional practice.49 Despite the
events of the Protestant Reformation, the modern Catholic Church continues

41. Id.
42. Canon law is “the body of laws and regulations made by or adopted
ecclesiastical authority, for the government of the Christian organization and its
members.” Auguste Boudinhon, Canon Law, 9 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA 56
(1910), http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/09056a.htm [https://perma.cc/KX2QPSUN].
43. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1 (“The sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore, it
is absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in words or
in any manner and for any reason.”).
44. Id.
45. Auguste Boudinhon, Excommunication, 5 THE CATHOLIC ENCYCLOPEDIA
678 (1909); see also Brooks, supra note 12, at 120.
46. Jacob Yellin, The History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege,
23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 96–101 (1983).
47. Id. at 97.
48. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 736.
49. Yellin, supra note 46, at 101–02. Members of the Catholic Church are
required to confess their sins at least once a year. 1983 CODE c.989.
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to uphold confidential Confession in accordance with the sacrament’s
historical basis.
C. The Clergy-Penitent Privilege in Jurisprudence and Statutory Law
State legislatures across the United States have incorporated the seal
of confession into statutory law through adoption of the clergy-penitent
privilege. National endorsement of the privilege reflects a public policy
that values the sanctity of conversations between members of a particular
faith and their religious advisors.50 Moreover, when religious doctrine
explicitly requires clergy to abide by a duty of confidentiality, the privilege
is not merely socially desirable—it also implicates the constitutional right
to Free Exercise of religious belief.51
1. People v. Philips: Validating the Seal of Confession in a Court of
Law
The first instance of an American court addressing the validity of the
Catholic seal of confession occurred in People v. Philips, an 1813 criminal
case from the Court of General Sessions of the City of New York.52 The
defendant and his wife were indicted for possessing stolen goods.53 The
owner of the goods reported that the stolen items had been returned to him
by a Catholic priest, Father Anthony Kohlmann, who had received the
goods from the thieves with the instructions that they be returned to their
rightful owner.54 When summoned to testify at trial to confirm the thieves’
identities, Kohlmann refused to provide any information because he had
learned their identities within the sacrament of Confession.55 The court
then had to decide whether the priest could be compelled to divulge the
secrets of a religious communication.56

50. Paul Winters, Whom Must the Clergy Protect? The Interests of At-Risk
Children in Conflict with Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 62 DEPAUL L. REV. 187, 188
(2012).
51. Brooks, supra note 12, at 120.
52. The case was never officially published but was reprinted in WILLIAM
SAMPSON, THE CATHOLIC QUESTION IN AMERICA (1813). The case was reprinted
again in Privileged Communications to Clergymen, 1 CATHOLIC LAW 199 (1955).
53. Privileged Communications, supra note 52.
54. Id. at 199–200.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 200.
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Kohlmann presented a compelling argument for protecting the seal of
confession in his request that the court excuse him from testifying,
invoking his deeply held religious convictions:
. . . if called upon to testify in quality of a minister of a sacrament,
in which my God himself has enjoined on me a perpetual and
inviolable secrecy, I must declare to this honorable Court, that I
cannot, I must not answer any question that has a bearing upon the
restitution in question; and that it would be my duty to prefer
instantaneous death or any temporal misfortune, rather than
disclose the name of the penitent in question. For, were I to act
otherwise, I should become a traitor to my church, to my sacred
ministry and to my God. . . . I should render myself guilty of eternal
damnation.57
The court ultimately found Kohlmann’s testimony inadmissible, basing its
reasoning upon the priest’s right to freely exercise his religion under the New
York Constitution.58 The court declared that the right to Free Exercise mandates
that particular rules of religious ceremonies be protected; furthermore, it noted
that secrecy is essential to the sacrament of Confession because penitents would
have no incentive to pronounce their sins to a priest if the veil of confidentiality
were removed.59
Philips was the first example of an American court endorsing an
evidentiary privilege exclusively for clergy. Extending a privilege to Catholic
priests made logical sense from a Free Exercise standpoint because failure to
respect the seal of confession would destroy a fundamental component of
Catholicism: private confession of one’s sins to a priest without fear of thirdparty knowledge.60 Whether the privilege would have the same application to
non-Catholic clergy remained unclear in the immediate aftermath of Philips.
Four years after the decision, however, a different New York state court held
in People v. Smith that the privilege did not apply to a Protestant minister
regarding private confessions made to him by the defendant in that case.61
In distinguishing Philips, the Smith court noted the fundamental
differences between Catholicism and Protestantism. The principal disparity

57. SAMPSON, supra note 52, at 5, 8–12.
58. Privileged Communications, supra note 52, at 207. New York's constitution
provided that “the Free Exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever hereafter be allowed within this
state, to all mankind.” Id. (quoting N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXXVIII).
59. Privileged Communications, supra note 52, at 207.
60. Id.
61. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 738.
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was a matter of church doctrine. The trial judge in Smith drew a distinction
“between auricular confessions made to a priest in the course of discipline,
according to the canons of the church, and those made to a [Protestant] minister
. . . in confidence, merely as a friend or adviser.”62 Because Protestantism had
neither an analogue to the sacrament of Confession nor a seal of confidentiality
codified under church law, the court allowed the minister to testify.63
Additionally, the right to Free Exercise—a crucial factor in Philips—was not at
issue in Smith because the Protestant minister actually desired to testify and
faced no consequences for breaking the confidence of a private confession.64
Conversely, Philips involved a priest who staunchly refused to testify to avoid
violating his religious duty under the confessional seal.65
2. Codification of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege
In 1828, the New York Legislature enacted a statutory version of the
clergy-penitent privilege—the first law of its kind in the United States.66 The
statute stated that “[n]o minister of the gospel, or priest of any denomination
whatsoever, shall be allowed to disclose any confessions made to him in his
professional character, in the course of discipline enjoined by the rules or
practice of such denomination.”67 On its face, the law appeared to eliminate
lines drawn in prior jurisprudence by applying generally to all denominations
rather than singling out Catholicism; the privilege’s scope, however, was still
confined to confessions protected under church disciplines.68 In practice, the
law protected only Catholic confessions from disclosure69 and thus merely
codified the Philips decision.70
The rest of the nation eventually followed New York’s lead, and today all
50 states provide evidentiary privileges protecting certain communications
made to clergy.71 Some states apply the privilege only to communications

62. Privileged Communications, supra note 52, at 211 (emphasis added).
63. See id. at 207.
64. See id. at 207, 211.
65. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 738 n.81; Privileged Communications, supra
note 52, at 210–11.
66. N.Y. REV STAT., pt. 3, ch. 7, tit. 3, art. 8, § 72 (1828); see also Seward P.
Reese, Confidential Communications to the Clergy, 24 OHIO ST. L.J. 55, 57 (1963).
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Brooks, supra note 12, at 122.
70. Id.
71. Norman Abrams, Addressing the Tension Between the Clergy-Communicant
Privilege and the Duty to Report Child Abuse in State Statutes, 44 B.C. L. REV. 1127,
1133–35 (2003).
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deemed confidential under the tenets of a particular religion.72 Other states
broaden the privilege to all private conversations with religious leaders,
regardless of church doctrine.73 Though each state law varies in phrasing, no
modern-day statute explicitly limits the privilege to Catholicism.74 A
generally applicable privilege presents a range of interpretation issues. The
clergy-penitent privilege originated to protect a specific and easily
recognizable form of communication: oral confessions of sin to a priest
within the Catholic sacrament of Confession.75 Extending the privilege
beyond the scope of its original design forces lawmakers and judges to
consider the different types of communications made to clergy of various
religions and determine which ones fall under the umbrella of protected
communications.76
In 1972, the United States Supreme Court approved an amendment to
the Federal Rules of Evidence that would have codified the clergy-penitent
privilege. Proposed Rule 506 stated “[a] person has a privilege to refuse to
disclose and to prevent another from disclosing a confidential communication
by the person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual
adviser.”77 Congress never enacted the rule, opting for the more general
and adaptable Rule 501,78 which allows rules of privilege to be shaped by
federal common law and evolve on a case-by-case basis.79 Though never
implemented, Proposed Rule 506 is still a guiding force in statutory
construction of the clergy-penitent privilege at the state level.80

72. Brooks, supra note 12, at 123.
73. Id.
74. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 747; see generally CHILDREN’S BUREAU,
supra note 11.
75. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 747.
76. Id.
77. See FED. R. EVID. 506 (Proposed Official Draft 1972).
78. Federal Rule of Evidence 501 states:
The common law—as interpreted by United States courts in the light of
reason and experience—governs a claim of privilege unless any of the
following provides otherwise: the United States Constitution; a federal
statute; or rules prescribed by the Supreme Court. But in a civil case,
state law governs privilege regarding a claim or defense for which state
law supplies the rule of decision.
FED. R. EVID. 501 (2017).
79. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 740.
80. Id.
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3. The Supreme Court Validates the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, if
Only in Dicta
The United States Supreme Court has addressed the clergy-penitent
privilege a handful of times, though only indirectly. In Totten v. United
States, an 1875 case concerning national secrets, the Court noted in dicta
that “suits cannot be maintained which would require a disclosure of the
confidences of the confessional.”81 Almost a century later in United States
v. Nixon, the Supreme Court again addressed the privilege, stating that
although discussions between President Richard Nixon and his staff were
not subject to a privilege of confidentiality, a priest, alternatively, could
not be compelled by a court to disclose information revealed to him in a
confessional context.82
Finally, in Trammel v. United States, the Court discussed the rationale
behind maintaining the sanctity of religious conversations, stating that the
clergy-penitent privilege “recognizes the human need to disclose to a
spiritual counselor, in total and absolute confidence, what are believed to be
flawed acts or thoughts and to receive priestly consolation and guidance in
return.”83 The Court further noted that the privilege is based on the urgent
need for confidence and trust—two qualities that would disintegrate if
penitents knew clergy had the freedom to divulge private confessions to
third parties.84 Though mentioned in dicta in these three cases, the Supreme
Court has yet to rule directly on whether the United States Constitution
protects the clergy-penitent privilege.85
II. CHURCH AND STATE COLLIDE: MANDATORY REPORTING
LEGISLATION AND THE CLERGY
Although the clergy-penitent privilege has national endorsement, it is
sometimes subject to narrow interpretation in situations of suspected child
abuse.86 Following the nationwide adoption of mandatory reporting
statutes, many states named clergy as mandatory reporters. The dilemma
of whether to incorporate the clergy-penitent privilege into mandatory
reporting laws, however, sparked considerable debate.
81. Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875).
82. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 709 (1974).
83. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 51 (1980).
84. Id.
85. R. Michael Cassidy, Sharing Sacred Secrets: Is It (Past) Time for a
Dangerous Person Exception to the Clergy-Penitent Privilege?, 44 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1627, 1661 (2003).
86. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11, at 2.
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A. The States Take an Active Role in Policing Child Abuse
In 1974, Congress passed legislation making federal funds available
to states for child abuse prevention and treatment.87 To be eligible for
funding, states were required to enact legislation designating certain
individuals as legally mandated reporters of child abuse and neglect.88
Congress intended the conditional spending scheme to increase the
probability that the sufferings of abuse victims—often never reported at
all—would be disclosed to law enforcement.89 All 50 states eventually
complied with Congress’s guidelines.90 Each state currently has its own
comprehensive mandatory reporting scheme defining who is legally bound
to report abuse (“mandatory reporters”), the conditions in which abuse
must be reported, criminal penalties for failure to report, and whether
certain evidentiary privileges affect the duty to report.91
Mandatory reporters are generally adults whose employment grants
them a strategic vantage point for identifying signs of child abuse and for
undertaking the necessary steps to protect children.92 Mandatory reporting
laws typically list professionals, such as teachers, therapists, and doctors,
who are compelled to report serious allegations of child abuse discovered
within the scope of their employment.93 Many states name clergy as
mandatory reporters but, unlike most other professions, clergy often
receive certain exemptions to the general mandate to report based on the
clergy-penitent privilege.94
1. Clergy as Mandatory Reporters: The Balancing Act of Satisfying
Public Policy and Religious Freedom
In 2002, the “Spotlight” investigative team of reporters for the Boston
Globe published an exposé on a decades-long sexual abuse scandal within

87. Winters, supra note 50, at 197.
88. Id.
89. Jack Jenkins, Unholy secrets: The legal loophole that allows clergy to hide
child sexual abuse, THINK PROGRESS (Aug. 8, 2016), https://thinkprogress.org
/unholy-secrets-the-legal-loophole-that-allows-clergy-to-hide-child-sexual-abuse-9
a6899029eb5#.kaojfci6z [https://perma.cc/5A7M-XJLN].
90. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11.
91. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 728.
92. Winters, supra note 50, at 189.
93. See Jenkins, supra note 89.
94. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11.
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the Catholic Church in Boston.95 The investigation revealed that child
abuse ran rampant in the metropolitan area as local bishops knowingly
concealed sexually abusive priests by shuffling them to new locations when
their actions began attracting negative attention from parishioners.96
In the wake of the Spotlight investigation, the Massachusetts Legislature
rushed to soothe the public outcry directed at the abusive priests and the
complicit bishops whose silence allowed these horrific acts to persist.97
Legislators agreed that to avoid another scandal, clergy must be brought into
the fold of mandatory reporters, but the scope of the proposed legislation gave
rise to sharp divisions and significant debate.98 A major point of contention
was whether to incorporate the clergy-penitent privilege into the law or
abrogate the privilege entirely in circumstances of abuse.99 Some lawmakers
argued that a statutory exemption for information learned in the confessional
must exist to protect religious rights of clergy.100 Others urged that abuse must
be reported regardless of the context of disclosure and that clergy should be
treated no differently than other mandatory reporters who possess an
unconditional duty to report.101 Even more strongly opposed to the inclusion
of the privilege were constituents who claimed that making exceptions for
clergy protects criminals, thereby allowing abusive behavior to continue at
the expense of victims.102
Ultimately, strong lobbying efforts and threats of lawsuits from
religious organizations resulted in the inclusion of the exemption in the
Massachusetts mandatory reporting law.103 The Massachusetts example
illustrates the tension between church and state that makes the drafting of
mandatory reporting laws for clergy so difficult. The failure of such a
95. Michael Rezendes, Church Allowed Abuse by Priest for Years: Aware of
Geoghan Record, Archdiocese Still Shuttled Him from Parish to Parish, BOS. GLOBE
(Jan. 6, 2002), http://www.bostonglobe.com/news/special-reports/2002/01/06/churchallowed-abuse-priest-for-years/cSHfGkTIrAT25qKGvBuDNM/story.html [https://per
ma.cc/WKT2-EMZS].
96. Id.
97. See Jenkins, supra note 89.
98. Michael Paulson, Sex Abuse Reporting Measure Hits Snag: House, Senate
Divided over Clergy Exemptions, BOS. GLOBE (Mar. 7, 2002), http://archive.boston.com
/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/030702_reporting.htm [https://perma.cc/8KFN-C74Z].
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Emily Eakin, Secrets Confided to the Clergy Are Getting Harder to Keep,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2002), http://www.nytimes.com/2002/02/16/arts/secretsconfided-to-the-clergy-are-getting-harder-to-keep.html [https://perma.cc/72YNNK5U].
103. Jenkins, supra note 89.
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monumental abuse scandal to motivate a state legislature to disregard the
clergy-penitent privilege demonstrates the weight lawmakers sometimes
place on religious rights in crafting mandatory reporting legislation.
Today, clergy are defined explicitly as mandatory reporters in 28 states
and Guam.104 Of these states, the overwhelming majority do not require clergy
to report allegations of child abuse if the information is learned within a
religious communication.105 These legal protections, known as “confessional
shields” or “carve-outs,” functioned as a compromise for divided state
legislatures, allowing for the expansion of mandatory reporting law without
infringing upon religious freedoms of clergy.106
2. States Abrogating the Clergy-Penitent Privilege for Suspected Child
Abuse
Six states and one United States territory abrogated the clergy-penitent
privilege in their mandatory reporting legislation.107 These states embrace
two different approaches to abrogation. The first and most explicit form
involves states that specifically list clergy as mandatory reporters and
expressly deny the privilege within the mandatory reporting statute.108
West Virginia, New Hampshire, and Guam followed this route.109 The
other method of abrogation is more subtle but has the same effect: a
number of states do not list individual categories of mandatory reporters
but rather mandate that “any person” who has suspicions of child abuse
must report this information.110 Of the states listing “any person” as a
mandatory reporter, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, and Texas
abrogate the privilege not by explicitly denying its existence, but by
broadly denying the existence of all evidentiary privileges—with the

104. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11, at 1.
105. Id. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Georgia,
Illinois, Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri,
Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania,
South Carolina, Vermont, and Wisconsin grant the privilege but limit it to pastoral
communications. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Id. Under West Virginia’s mandatory reporting law, “The privileged quality
of communications between husband and wife and between any professional person
and his or her patient or his or her client, except that between attorney and client,
is hereby abrogated in situations involving suspected or known child abuse or
neglect.” W. VA. CODE § 49-2-811 (2017).
110. CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11, at 1.
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exception of the attorney-client privilege—in cases of suspected child
abuse.111
A Texas state court of appeals addressed the Texas Legislature’s
abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege in Bordman v. State.112 The
defendant in Bordman appealed his convictions for aggravated sexual
assault of his three children on the grounds that his confession of the
assaults to his Methodist minister was inadmissible based on privilege.113
The court held that Texas’s mandatory reporting statute indicated a clear
legislative intent to disregard the privilege in a judicial proceeding
concerning sexual abuse of a child.114 As a result, the court affirmed the
defendant’s convictions.115
Bordman is reminiscent of the early New York cases of Philips and
Smith in illustrating the crucial differences between Catholicism and
Protestantism in the application of the clergy-penitent privilege.116 The
court in Bordman did not delve into the constitutionality of the Texas
statute—likely because the Methodist minister had no objection to
testifying about the confession.117 Unlike Catholicism, Methodism—a
Protestant religion—lacks a formal practice of confidential confessions
between minister and penitent and does not penalize clergy for revealing
private confessions.118 If the clergy member in Bordman were a Catholic
priest rather than a Methodist minister, however, then the priest may have
been unwilling to testify at the risk of expulsion from the Church like in

111. Id. An example of the “any person” standard is:
Every person having reason to believe that a child under age eighteen (18)
years is a victim of abuse or neglect shall report the matter promptly to the
Department of Human Services . . . . No privilege or contract shall relieve any
person from the requirement of reporting pursuant to this section.
OKLA. STAT. tit. 10A, § 1-2-101(B)(1), (3) (2017).
112. Bordman v. State, 56 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. Ct. App. 2001).
113. Id. at 67.
114. Id. at 68. The Texas statute provides the following: “In a proceeding
regarding the abuse or neglect of a child, evidence may not be excluded on the
ground of privileged communication except in the case of communications
between an attorney and client.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 261.202 (2017).
115. Bordman, 56 S.W.3d at 73.
116. See discussion supra Part I.C.I.
117. Brooks, supra note 12, at 128 n.71.
118. See Joe Iovino, Before God and one another: United Methodists and
confession, UNITED METHODIST COMMC’NS (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.umc.org
/what-we-believe/before-god-and-one-another-united-methodists-and-confession
[https://perma.cc/29QM-9TCQ].
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Philips.119 A resistant priest also might have raised a Free Exercise
challenge in response to Texas’s abrogation of the privilege.
3. A Code in Conflict: Mandatory Reporting Law in Louisiana
In Louisiana, the Children’s Code provides the guidelines for mandatory
reporting of child abuse.120 The overarching policy goal of the legislation is to
protect the health and well-being of children through the identification and
prevention of physical abuse, neglect, and exploitation.121 The Children’s
Code provides a list of professionals defined as mandatory reporters of
suspected child abuse. This list includes professions such as health
practitioners, police officers, teachers, and athletic coaches.122 Failure to fulfill
one’s duties as a mandatory reporter can result in criminal prosecution.123 The
maximum penalty for a knowing or willful failure to report is a $500 fine
and a six-month prison sentence.124
Clergy are mandatory reporters in Louisiana but are not mandated to report
sexual abuse allegations if two factors are present. First, the clergy member
must be authorized by his religion to hear confidential communications. A
communication is “confidential” when it is “made privately and not intended
for further disclosure except to other persons present in furtherance of the
purpose of the communication.”125 Second, the clergy member must be bound
under religious doctrine to keep such communications confidential.126 If these
requirements are met, the clergy member is only legally required to encourage
the person alleging the abuse to report the information to the proper
authorities.127

119. 1983 CODE c.1388, § 1.
120. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 601 (2017). The relevant laws are listed under Title
VI: Child in Need of Care. Id.
121. Id. The law states that:
The purpose of this Title is to protect children whose physical or mental
health and welfare is substantially at risk of harm by physical abuse,
neglect, or exploitation and who may be further threatened by the
conduct of others, by providing for the reporting of suspected cases of
abuse . . . . The health, safety, and best interest of the child shall be the
paramount concern in all proceedings under this Title.
Id.
122. Id. art. 603(17).
123. Id. art. 609(A)(2).
124. LA. REV. STAT. § 14:403(A)(1)(a) (2017).
125. LA. CODE EVID. art. 511(A)(2) (2017).
126. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 603(17)(c).
127. Id.
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The Children’s Code also states that, regardless of the privileged nature
of the communication, any mandatory reporter with reason to believe a child’s
physical or mental well-being is in danger as a result of abuse must report his
suspicions to law enforcement.128 The Louisiana Supreme Court recently held
that a clergy member meeting the requirements necessary to invoke the
privilege is no longer considered a mandatory reporter under the law.129
Consequently, clergy falling under the exemption have no legal duty to report
child abuse.130
The ability to waive privilege in a protected communication rests not in
the clergy member but rather in the penitent.131 According to the Louisiana
Code of Evidence, “[a] person has a privilege to refuse to disclose and to
prevent another person from disclosing a confidential communication by the
person to a clergyman in his professional character as spiritual adviser.”132
Clergy may only claim the privilege on a person’s behalf or on behalf of a
deceased person.133 Thus, the penitent alone may waive the privilege in
Louisiana.
III. A PRIVILEGE STEEPED IN FIRST AMENDMENT ISSUES
The inclusion of clergy in mandatory reporting legislation presents a
tension between the two Religion Clauses of the First Amendment: the
Free Exercise Clause and Establishment Clause.134 Among states listing
clergy as mandatory reporters, two broad categories of legislation exist:
statutes abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege entirely in situations of
child abuse and statutes providing “confessional shields” or “carve-outs” to
protect certain communications between clergy and their communicants.135
Each type of legislation poses potential challenges under the First
Amendment.
For the handful of states that opted for abrogation, an unconditional
mandate to report child abuse arguably offends Free Exercise rights because
clergy may have religiously motivated reasons for refusing to disclose
private conversations with their communicants.136 Alternatively, states with
confessional carve-outs may potentially violate the Establishment Clause by
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.

Id. art. 609(A)(1).
Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030, 1038 (La. 2016).
Id.
LA. CODE EVID. art. 511(B) (2017).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id.
See U.S. CONST. amend. I.
See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11.
Mitchell, supra note 17, at 794.
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defining which religions merit the protection of the privilege and which do
not.137 Catholicism benefits most of all from confessional carve-outs
because it is one of the few religions having both an established practice of
private confessions and an absolute duty of confidentiality codified under
church law.138
A. Abrogation of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege: A Permissible
Infringement on Free Exercise
Under the First Amendment, “Congress shall make no law respecting
an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”139
The Free Exercise Clause, which applies to individual states as well as the
federal government,140 refers to “the right to believe and profess whatever
religious doctrine one desires.”141 When the government forbids certain
activities that are performed solely for religious reasons, the Free Exercise
Clause is violated.142 For example, the government cannot ban the production
of statues designed exclusively for religious worship or prohibit the practice
of bowing down in front of a golden calf.143 The government also cannot force
individuals to engage in activities offensive to their religious beliefs unless
some overriding state interest justifies the compulsion of a certain action.144
When a state compels disclosure of a confidential communication over
the resistance of a member of the clergy, the right to Free Exercise may be
violated if the grounds for objection are rooted in religious belief.145
Potential religious bases for objection are numerous: a particular religion
may explicitly prohibit disclosure; the clergy member may not want to
breach the trust of his clerical office; or the clergy member may fear that
communicants will be deterred from seeking religious counseling in the
future if confidentiality is not guaranteed.146
Free Exercise is not an absolute right; clergy may not invoke this
clause to avoid engaging in any form of conduct offensive to their religious

137. Id. at 779.
138. See generally Privileged Communications, supra note 52; Mitchell, supra
note 17, at 754 n.175.
139. U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
140. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940).
141. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
142. Id.
143. Id. at 877–78.
144. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 794.
145. Id.
146. Id.
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beliefs.147 To allow an individual to claim immunities from every state law
that conflicts with his religious values and opinions effectually “permit[s]
every citizen to become a law unto himself.”148 In certain situations,
government interference with religious practice is necessary and
constitutionally permissible, a reality addressed by the United States
Supreme Court throughout its history.149 For a state to justify infringement
upon Free Exercise, it must show that the burden is incidental to a neutral
and generally applicable law or, in certain jurisdictions, that the burden
serves a compelling state interest in the least restrictive way possible. 150
States abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege within mandatory reporting
laws must demonstrate the constitutionality of their legislation under the
standards set by the Supreme Court and potentially under the more
restrictive standards enacted by individual state legislatures.
1. Employment Division v. Smith: Illustrating the Limits of Free
Exercise Claims
The landmark Supreme Court decision of Employment Division v.
Smith provides one standard that guides lower courts and state legislatures
regarding Free Exercise issues.151 The Smith plaintiffs, two Oregon citizens
belonging to the Native American Church, were fired from their jobs as drug
rehabilitation counselors for consuming peyote, an illegal hallucinogenic

147. Id. at 806.
148. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 166–67 (1878).
149. See, e.g., id. (holding that the First Amendment allows regulation of
religious practices); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402–03 (1963) (noting that
the Free Exercise Clause does not protect overt religious acts that threaten public
safety). Freedom to believe is an absolute right and not subject to balancing with
state interests. See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492–93 (1961) (holding
that a state may not for any reason require its public officials to profess belief in
God). If, on the other hand, a law burdens religious conduct, the state can defend its
law by showing that the law is necessary to some compelling state interest. See
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406. The state may also claim the law is a valid, neutral law
of general applicability. Emp’t Div., Dept. of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
878 (1990). Mandatory reporting requirements fall into the “burdening conduct”
category: statutes that abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege punish a clergy
member for the “act” of refusing to report. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 806 n.442.
150. See Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 879; see also State Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts, N AT ’ L C ONF. OF S TATE LEGISLATORS (Dec. 15, 2015),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/civil-and-criminal-justice/state-rfra-statutes.aspx
[https://perma.cc/8LPA-NVX9].
151. See generally Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. 872.
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drug, as part of a religious ceremony.152 Oregon law classified peyote as a
controlled substance and defined the possession of peyote as a felony.153 The
plaintiffs subsequently were denied unemployment benefits for being
terminated as a result of job-related misconduct.154 Citing the First
Amendment, the plaintiffs argued that denial of compensation based on their
sacramental consumption of peyote infringed upon their right to Free
Exercise.155
Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia argued that mere possession of
religious beliefs that go against societal interests does not relieve an individual
from his civic responsibilities.156 Justice Scalia analogized Oregon’s law
criminalizing peyote to laws involving tax collection: a person who believes
that financially supporting organized government violates his religious
convictions cannot simply refuse to pay his taxes because the burden is
incidental to a neutral and valid purpose of collecting revenue.157 The
Court held that denial of the plaintiffs’ unemployment benefits was lawful
because “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object . . . but
merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and otherwise valid
provision,” then the right to Free Exercise is not offended.158 Because the
Oregon law’s unbiased and lawful purpose was to deter all Oregon citizens
from drug use, the plaintiffs could not claim exemption from compliance
based on their religion’s encouragement of peyote use in sacramental
ceremonies.159
Mandatory reporting legislation abrogating the clergy-penitent
privilege easily survives a Free Exercise challenge under Smith. In fact,
eliminating the privilege actually enhances the general applicability of
mandatory reporting laws. Mandatory reporting legislation is not
religiously motivated but rather is driven by a neutral incentive to compel
disclosure of child abuse by the people most likely to discover this
information in their individual professions.160 Clergy are not alone in their
mandate to report. Louisiana, for example, lists ten additional categories
of professions as mandatory reporters, spanning a broad cross-section of

152. Id. at 874.
153. OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987).
154. Emp’t Div., 494 U.S. at 874.
155. Id. at 890.
156. Id. at 879 (quoting Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Gobitis, 310
U.S. 586, 594–95 (1940)).
157. Id. at 878.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 878–79, 882.
160. See LA. CHILD. CODE art. 601 (2017).
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society.161 Including clergy in the class of mandatory reporters suggests an
impartial legislative decision to give them the same responsibility as
secular professionals to aid the state in policing child abuse.162 Neutrality
also exists in the legislation’s underlying policy goal. The mandate to
report child abuse arises from the legislative objectives of safeguarding
children and preventing future abuse.163 In Louisiana, the Children’s Code
clearly states that the welfare of the child is the “paramount concern” in
all legal proceedings concerning child abuse.164
2. The States Push Back Against Smith: A Revival of the Sherbert
Test
Although the Smith test demonstrates that abrogation of the clergypenitent privilege in mandatory reporting statutes is a permissible
infringement on Free Exercise rights, a more stringent analysis may be
required under the laws of Louisiana and 21 other states.165 In the wake of
Smith, Congress quickly reacted to the Supreme Court’s rather lenient test
by passing the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (“RFRA”) in an effort
to implement a more rigorous standard for states to satisfy in justifying
burdens on Free Exercise.166 The RFRA reinstated the “compelling state
interest” test set by the Supreme Court in Sherbert v. Verner—the
predecessor to Smith in Free Exercise jurisprudence.167 In Sherbert, the
Court held that a state cannot refuse to provide unemployment benefits to
a woman whose religion required her to abstain from working on
Saturdays.168 The Court stated that “laws which burden free exercise of
religion must be justified by a compelling state interest which cannot be

161. Id. art. 603(17). The list of mandatory reporters includes health practitioners,
mental health practitioners, teachers/child care providers, law enforcement officials,
commercial film and photographic print processors, mediators, parenting coordinators,
court-appointed special advocates, youth activity providers, and school coaches. Id.
162. Winters, supra note 50, at 208.
163. Id.
164. LA. CHILD. CODE art. 601.
165. State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts, supra note 150.
166. Brooks, supra note 12, at 126; 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b), repealed by City
of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (“Government may substantially burden
a person’s Free Exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person – (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest;
and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental
interest.”).
167. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963).
168. Id. at 410–11.
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achieved without infringing Free Exercise rights,” a standard commonly
known as strict scrutiny.169
Strict scrutiny had been the test for determining constitutionality of
laws burdening Free Exercise until Smith overruled the Sherbert analysis.170
Congress enacted the RFRA in response to public dissatisfaction with the
Smith decision, and, for a brief period, strict scrutiny was revived for Free
Exercise cases.171 Ultimately, the Supreme Court struck down the RFRA in
City of Boerne v. Flores as an unconstitutional exercise of congressional
power in terms of the law’s application to the individual states.172 Many states,
including Louisiana, responded to City of Boerne by enacting their own
religious freedom laws.173 Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act
adopted statutory language virtually identical to the RFRA.174 Consequently,
in states with RFRA-inspired legislation, the more demanding strict scrutiny
test—rather than the less onerous Smith test—may be applicable for analyzing
the constitutionality of abrogating the clergy-penitent privilege in mandatory
reporting legislation.
3. Applying the Compelling State Interest Test to an Unconditional
Mandate for Clergy to Report Child Abuse
Under strict scrutiny, a compelling state interest justifies upholding
mandatory reporting laws that abrogate the clergy-penitent privilege.
Additionally, eliminating the privilege for the specific purpose of protecting
children in immediate danger of sexual abuse is the least restrictive means
of furthering the governmental interest of identifying and preventing child
abuse.
a. Compelling State Interest
In proving a compelling state interest, a state can emphasize the
obvious importance of protecting children from harm. The motive behind
mandatory reporting legislation is to reveal as many incidents of ongoing
169. Brooks, supra note 12, at 124 (citing Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 406–07).
170. Id.; see also Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 398.
171. Brooks, supra note 12, at 126.
172. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997).
173. Since 1993, 21 states have enacted their own versions of the RFRA.
Though the intention of these laws is to mimic the federal RFRA, each individual
law is not necessarily identical to the federal law. State Religious Freedom
Restoration Acts, supra note 150.
174. LA. REV. STAT. § 13:5233 (2017); 42 U.S.C. 2000bb-1(b), repealed by City
of Boerne, 521 US 507.
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or imminent abuse as possible so the state can promptly intervene—either
to mitigate the situation or to stop the abuse from happening in the first
place.175 The state also has a responsibility to safeguard its children under
the doctrine of parens patriae (“parent of the country”), which requires
states to act as “parents” to their most dependent citizens.176 The doctrine
provides a strong basis for state intervention in protecting innocent victims
of child sexual abuse. In addition to the primary goal of protecting
children, states may also desire to rehabilitate or punish abusers.177
To further bolster a compelling state interest, states can argue that
doing away with the clergy-penitent privilege in mandatory reporting
statutes is crucial to avoiding issues that arise when clergy try to deal with
child abuse epidemics within their own ranks.178 States can point to the
Catholic Church’s disastrous history of addressing issues of child abuse
“in-house.”179 Church attempts at self-policing child abuse without the
knowledge or aid of law enforcement often exacerbate and perpetuate
abuse.180 The Spotlight exposé documented how church leadership within
the Archdiocese of Boston discouraged families of victims from reporting the
abuse to law enforcement, entered into confidential settlements with affected
families, and moved abusive priests to new church parishes where patterns of

175. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 807.
176. Id.; see also Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169–70 (1944)
(stating that the right to Free Exercise of religion does not include freedom to
endanger the well-being of children).
177. Mitchell, supra note 17, at 807 n.447.
178. Brooks, supra note 12, at 138.
179. See, e.g., OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, COMMONWEALTH OF
MASSACHUSETTS, THE SEXUAL ABUSE OF CHILDREN IN THE ROMAN CATHOLIC
ARCHDIOCESE OF BOSTON 30–52 (2003), http://www.bishop-accountability.org
/resources/resource-files/reports/ReillyReport.pdf (reporting actions of Catholic
authorities in dealing with allegations of child sex abuse by priests in the
Archdiocese of Boston) [https://perma.cc/3MF4-MM5V].
180. See id. (reporting actions of Catholic authorities in dealing with allegations
of child sex abuse by priests in the Archdiocese of Boston). The report found:
By practice and policy, information concerning the complaints of abuse
was shared with only a small number of senior Archdiocese officials, and
only these officials were responsible for fashioning a response to the
harm to children in the Archdiocese. As a result, the response by the
Archdiocese reflected tragically misguided priorities. Top Archdiocese
officials regularly addressed and supported the perceived needs of
offending priests more than the needs of children who had been, or were
at risk of being, abused.
Id.
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abuse continued.181 In light of failed attempts by the Catholic Church to
adequately monitor and prevent this issue of child abuse, a state can argue that
it has a much stronger claim to the physical protection of its citizens. A state can
support this argument by showing that its law enforcement robustly investigates
cases of reported child abuse and uses effective and appropriate procedures in
intervening to protect abused children.182 States that satisfactorily police child
abuse can thus make a strong case that abrogation of the privilege increases the
probability that authorities receive immediate notice of abuse for the purpose of
swift and efficient intervention.183
Finally, states can argue that exceptions made for clergy within
mandatory reporting statutes create ambiguity in the law.184 Difficulty may
arise in a clergy member’s determination of whether his suspicions of child
abuse result solely from the privileged communication or from nonprivileged observations.185 For instance, a Catholic priest initially may learn
allegations of abuse within the confessional before later observing signs of
abuse outside the sacrament, such as bruises on a child’s arm.186 The priest
may feel compelled to refrain from reporting because he would not have
noticed subsequent signs of abuse in the non-privileged setting if not for the
initial confidential communication.187 The priest may assume that once
information regarding child abuse is learned in a privileged conversation his
duty to report no longer exists.188
b. Least Restrictive Means/Narrow Tailoring
A clear compelling state interest is only half of the analysis. If a clergy
member challenges a mandatory reporting requirement in a state with RFRAinspired legislation, the state also must show that an unconditional mandate to
report is necessary to attain the goal of protecting children from abuse and that
the law is tailored in the least restrictive way possible to achieve that goal.189
In other words, a state must prove it cannot adequately carry out its mission
to identify and prevent sexual abuse of children unless clergy are considered
mandatory reporters within the context of confidential communications. If the

181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

Rezendes, supra note 95.
Mitchell, supra note 17, at 811.
See id.
Brooks, supra note 12, at 139.
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See id. at 139–40.
See id. at 140.
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state can prove that it cannot promote its interest without infringing on Free
Exercise, then a burden on religion is justified.
In proving the need for abrogation of the privilege, states can reference
the unique position of a clergy member “as confidant, spiritual adviser, and
[in certain religions] bespeaker of God’s forgiveness.”190 State legislatures do
not compile their lists of mandatory reporters arbitrarily; the professionals
selected represent those persons most likely to gain knowledge of sexual
abuse of children within their respective professions.191 In their daily life and
ministry, clergy occupy a strategic position to observe family interactions, and
distressed individuals frequently reach out to clergy for advice and guidance,
often within a confidential setting.192 The intimate nature of the clerical office
results in an increased likelihood that abusers, victims, and third parties with
knowledge of ongoing or imminent abuse will divulge this information to
clergy.193 A state can argue that clergy are an indispensable source in its
mission to identify and prevent abuse of children.194 Because valuable
information is frequently learned within private communications, states
cannot adequately police child abuse without an unconditional mandate for
clergy to report that extends to confidential settings.
Furthermore, children’s innocence and inability to comprehend the
gravity of their own abuse support the argument that abrogation of the
privilege is a necessary means of carrying out the state’s compelling interest.
Reporting exemptions for clergy have a negative effect on children who do
not understand the implications of confidential communications and
confessional privileges. Child victims may go to clergy for counsel in a
confidential setting out of fear, embarrassment, or a lack of resolve to tell
parents or law enforcement about their abuse.195 The existence of confessional
shields aggravates the traumatizing process children undergo in reporting
abuse. Legislation restricting the frequency of disclosure worsens an alreadydire scenario: only one-third of child abuse victims report their abuse in a
timely manner, and the remaining victims either wait several years to tell
or never disclose the abuse.196 Many children who reveal their experiences
of abuse will only tell their childhood peers who lack the maturity and
resources necessary to provide adequate assistance.197 Unlike these child
confidantes, clergy have the means and experience to provide immediate
190.
191.
192.
193.
194.
195.
196.
197.

Mitchell, supra note 17, at 807.
Winters, supra note 50, at 189.
Mitchell, supra note 17, at 811.
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Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177, 1178 (La. 2014).
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and effective aid to victims.198 As such, the least restrictive way of
maximizing the reporting of child abuse for the children who do choose to
disclose their abuse to members of clergy is to abrogate the clergy-penitent
privilege in the context of confidential communications.
States can tailor their legislation narrowly by abrogating the privilege
only in the specific situation where clergy have reason to believe a child
is being abused currently or is in imminent danger of being abused.199 In
keeping with the compelling state interest of protecting children,
abrogation of the privilege logically must apply when anyone alleges
abuse to a clergy member, whether that person is the victim, the abuser, or
some third party.200
B. Establishment Clause Issues: Favoring the Catholic Church over All
Other Religions
Under the Establishment Clause, Congress is forbidden from
instituting a national religion.201 Even though the text of the clause only
references Congress, its terms apply to the states as well.202 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has interpreted the clause as forbidding both the
favoring of and discrimination against particular religions.203 Many states
have mandatory reporting legislation that grants the clergy-penitent
privilege only to religions imposing a duty of secrecy on their clergy under
church doctrine.204 Even though these exceptions relieve the Free Exercise
problem by accommodating religions with established disciplines of
confidentiality, states that limit applicability of the privilege violate the
Establishment Clause by benefitting a handful of religions over all

198. Id.
199. Louisiana’s law is already tailored in this manner. See LA. CHILD. CODE
art. 609(A)(1) (2017).
200. See id. art. 601.
201. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
202. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 49–50 (1985) (stating that the Fourteenth
Amendment imposes the same substantive limits, including limits on establishing
religion, on the state’s legislative powers as the First Amendment imposes on
Congress); Everson v. Bd. of Educ. of Ewing, 330 U.S. 1, 8, 15 (1947) (holding
that the Fourteenth Amendment embraces the Establishment Clause).
203. See, e.g., Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244–46 (1982) (“The clearest
command of the Establishment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot
be officially preferred over another.”); Everson, 330 U.S. at 15 (“Neither a state
nor the Federal Government can pass laws which . . . prefer one religion over
another.”).
204. See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, supra note 11.
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others.205 Narrowing the privilege’s scope to religions with specific
disciplines of confidentiality also forces courts to entangle themselves in
interpretation of religious doctrine, a scenario over which the Supreme
Court has expressed great concern.206
1. Town of Greece v. Galloway: An Unbiased Treatment of Religion
In Town of Greece v. Galloway, the Supreme Court provided guidance in
analyzing conflicts between confessional carve-outs and the Establishment
Clause. In 1999, the town supervisor of Greece, New York instituted the
practice of opening monthly town board meetings with a prayer led by a
clergy member from the community.207 To select the prayer-givers, a town
employee would contact the heads of local religious congregations from the
telephone directory.208 At no point did the town exclude or deny particular
religions the opportunity to participate in leading prayer.209 Nevertheless,
from 1999 to 2007, all of the prayer leaders were members of Christian
faiths.210 Two regular attendees of the board meetings brought suit against
the town, alleging that it had violated the Establishment Clause by
favoring Christian prayer leaders over clergy members from other
religious denominations.211
Because the selection process was non-discriminatory and the town
made reasonable attempts to find non-Christian volunteers, the Court held
that the town did not violate the Establishment Clause.212 The Court further
noted that the fact that the overwhelming majority of prayer-givers
happened to be Christian was simply a natural effect of the demographics
of Greece, a town where nearly all the religious congregations were of
Christian denominations.213 Because the existing policies did not
intentionally favor one religion over another, the Court held that Greece
was not required “to search beyond its borders for non-Christian prayer
givers in an effort to achieve religious balancing.”214

205. Brooks, supra note 12, at 144.
206. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014); see also
Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616–18 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
207. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1816.
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Id. at 1817.
212. Id. at 1824.
213. Id.
214. Id.
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Finally, the Court declared that requiring Greece to implement diversity
requirements for prayer-givers would foster excessive government
entanglement with religion by forcing local leaders to make judgment calls
about the proper number of religions the town should sponsor and the
appropriate frequency with which each denomination should be represented
at the meetings.215 The Court concluded that the existing non-discriminatory
approach was sufficiently impartial toward individual religions and also
avoided the troubling prospect of the government defining which religions
were worthy of representation.216
2. Applying Galloway to Mandatory Reporting Law
Numerous states, including Louisiana, provide exemptions in their
mandatory reporting legislation for clergy engaged in communications
deemed confidential under the doctrines of their particular religion.217 By
covering only religions that mandate private confession to clergy, the
scope of the privilege is confined to the Roman Catholic Church and the
doctrinally similar Eastern Orthodox and Lutheran Churches.218 Under
Galloway, Louisiana and states with similarly worded legislation engage
in discriminatory treatment of the non-Catholic religions that lack formal
practices of confidential confession and duties of confidentiality. Unlike
the unbiased prayer leader selection process in Galloway, limitation of the
privilege to religions with established disciplines of confidentiality likely
violates the Establishment Clause by giving preferential treatment to a
particular type of clergy member to the exclusion of all others.219
Limiting the scope of the privilege additionally forces courts to parse
through religious doctrines in determining which circumstances divest a
clergy member of mandatory reporter status.220 The Supreme Court
expressed wariness toward governmental entanglement in religion in
Galloway in regards to a government body deciding which religions
deserve representation in opening prayers before town meetings.221 In a
similar way, the drafting of confessional carve-out statutes in Louisiana
and numerous other states forces the judiciary to determine which
religions deserve exemption from the mandate to report.222 Judges are
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
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required to take on the role of religious scholars and “engage in
comparative theology” by analyzing the doctrines of various religions, and
factfinders ultimately have to distinguish between denominations entitled
to the privilege and ones undeserving of the exception.223 Such an inquiry
is precisely the scenario feared by the Court in Galloway.
3. Resolving Establishment Clause Issues
One option for solving the Establishment Clause issue involves rewording
mandatory reporting statutes to prohibit compelled disclosure from clergy
engaged in any form of confidential communication regardless of whether it is
protected under church doctrine. State legislatures could use Proposed Rule
506 to the Federal Rules of Evidence as a rubric for redrafting. The proposed
law would extend the clergy-penitent privilege to scenarios in which clergy
engage in confidential communications with penitents while acting in their
“professional character as spiritual adviser[s].”224 Use of a broad standard
eliminates Establishment Clause problems by applying the privilege
impartially to all clergy operating under the scope of their clerical positions.225
This option is far from desirable from a public policy standpoint, however,
because it hinders the state in identifying and preventing child abuse by
significantly expanding the field of clergy who may claim exemptions from
mandatory reporter status.226
A more effective option requires abrogation of the privilege so all clergy
must report abuse regardless of the tenets of their faith. Under Galloway,
abrogation of the privilege for all clergy is non-discriminatory because no
religion receives preferential treatment.227 Furthermore, the government
can avoid excessive entanglement with religion because religious doctrine
would be irrelevant under the law, thus obviating the need to judicially
interpret church practices.
IV. MAYEUX V. CHARLET: ILLUMINATING THE DEFICIENCIES
OF CONFESSIONAL CARVE-OUTS
A confused and distraught Rebecca Mayeux entered the confessional
of her Catholic church in the summer of 2008 seeking to disclose not her
own sins but those of her abuser. The priest whom she trusted more than
223. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 616–18 (1992) (Souter, J., concurring).
224. FED. R. EVID. 506 (Proposed Official Draft 1972).
225. Id.
226. See LA. CHILD. CODE art. 601 (stating that the purpose of a mandatory
reporting scheme is to protect the well-being of children).
227. See Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1824 (2014).
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anyone to end her abuse allegedly met her cry for help with a cold and
unaccommodating response. Now this priest is the central defendant in
Mayeux’s civil lawsuit that seeks damages for his failure to take any action
to report the abuse.228 Mayeux’s case provides a concrete example of how
the presence of the clergy-penitent privilege in mandatory reporting law
hinders the state in its mission to police child abuse.
A. A Dark Secret Revealed in the Confessional
Rebecca Mayeux and George Charlet were members of Our Lady of
the Assumption Parish in the town of Clinton, Louisiana.229 Following a
relocation in 2000 to Clinton from their previous home in Baton Rouge,
the Mayeux family befriended Mr. Charlet and his wife after getting to
know the couple through their church community.230 As she grew from
childhood into adolescence, “Rebecca viewed Mr. Charlet as a second
grandfather.”231 In the summer of 2008, 14-year-old Mayeux agreed to
look after the Charlets’ grandchildren periodically.232 Mayeux exchanged
email addresses with the Charlets so they could contact her when they
needed a babysitter.233 At the beginning of the summer, 64-year-old Mr.
Charlet began an email correspondence with Mayeux consisting of one to two
emails per day, which included words of inspiration and daily Bible verses.234
According to Mayeux’s petition for damages, the correspondence became
inappropriate when Charlet started sending emails of a more personal nature
that were “laced with seductive nuances” and when the frequency of emails
gradually increased to five to seven emails per day.235 In July 2008, Charlet
took a trip to South Korea where he kept a handwritten diary addressed
specifically to Mayeux that documented his “passionate desire for her to
be in South Korea with him, again laced with both seductive and sexual
nuances.”236 According to Mayeux, the contact took on a physical nature
when Charlet returned from his travels. Charlet invited her to visit his
private office at the funeral home he managed under the pretense of having

228. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177 (La. 2014).
229. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 724, 726 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
230. Petition for Damages at 2, Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 724
(La. Ct. App. 2013) (No. 58-0066).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id.
235. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177, 1178 (La. 2014).
236. Petition for Damages, supra note 230, at 3.
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her pick up materials for a local scouting troop he wanted her to join. 237
When the two were alone together in the office, Charlet reportedly kissed
Mayeux, fondled her breasts, and told her “he wanted to make love to
her.”238
Fearful of telling her parents about the escalating sexual abuse,
Mayeux sought support and advice from her parish priest Father Jeff
Bayhi.239 Mayeux visited Bayhi three separate times during the summer to
receive the sacrament of Confession.240 Mayeux stated in her petition that
she revealed the details of Charlet’s abuse during her confessions.241 In
response, Bayhi allegedly advised her “to move past the abuse, suggesting
she ‘sweep it under the floor and get rid of it’” because the ramifications
of divulging her secrets would end up hurting too many people.242 Bayhi
reportedly made no efforts to stop the abuse, and the crimes Mayeux
described to him went unreported.243 According to Mayeux, the abuse
continued following the confessions, including one occasion in which
Charlet surreptitiously fondled her under the dining table while they were
eating lunch with his son, grandson, and Mrs. Charlet.244 A final incident
occurred when Rebecca visited Charlet’s office intending to confront him
about the abuse. Instead, the man reportedly overpowered her, forced her
onto a sofa, and aggressively kissed and groped her until a knock at the
front door of the funeral home interrupted his actions.245
Despite Bayhi’s alleged failure to report, the intimate relationship
between Charlet and Mayeux did not go wholly unnoticed. Several
parishioners observed Charlet’s inappropriate public displays of affection
toward Mayeux.246 Mayeux’s parents soon became aware of the obsessive
amount of telephone calls and emails Charlet had been sending their
daughter.247 Both parents confronted Rebecca and she confessed to them
the horrid details of her abuse.248 The Mayeuxs immediately contacted
Charlet, ordering him to cease all contact with Rebecca and proceeded to
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file a formal complaint against him with the sheriff’s department.249
During the initial investigation, however, Charlet died suddenly from a
massive heart attack following knee-replacement surgery.250
B. Procedural History: The Long and Winding Road to Trial
Despite the sudden death of Rebecca’s alleged abuser, parents Robert
and Lisa Mayeux brought a civil suit in July 2009 for damages caused by
the sexual and inappropriate acts inflicted on Rebecca.251 The petition
named as defendants the deceased Charlet, Father Bayhi, and the Roman
Catholic Church of the Diocese of Baton Rouge (“the Diocese”).252 The
Mayeuxs claimed that Charlet was liable as the alleged abuser, that Father
Bayhi was liable for failing to report abuse allegations under mandatory
reporting law, and that the Diocese was liable through vicarious liability
stemming from Bayhi’s reported failure to take action following Mayeux’s
revelations of abuse and for negligent hiring and training of the priest.253
The petition specifically alleged that Bayhi negligently advised Mayeux
during the confessions by telling her to handle the abusive situation
personally and that the priest negligently failed to report the abuse
immediately to law enforcement and to Mayeux’s parents.254
Before the trial was scheduled to begin, the Diocese filed a motion in
limine seeking to prohibit the plaintiffs from “mentioning, referencing,
and/or introducing evidence at trial of any confessions that may or may
not have taken place” between Bayhi and Mayeux while Bayhi was
performing his official role as a priest in hearing a confession from his
parishioner.255 The trial court denied the motion, finding that Mayeux’s
testimony regarding the confession was relevant and that, as holder of the
privilege, she was entitled to waive confidentiality and to testify about her
own communications.256 The trial court noted, however, the challenge
faced by Bayhi in which the priest’s religious duty under the sacramental
seal would prevent him from contesting Mayeux’s testimony.257 Moreover,
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according to Bayhi, the seal of confession mandates that a priest cannot
reveal if a confession even took place.258
The issue of Mayeux’s ability to testify reached the Louisiana Supreme
Court, which agreed with the trial court that Mayeux may speak on the
witness stand about the confessions.259 The Court declared that the privilege
belongs to the penitent, not the priest.260 It further stated that because the
holder of the privilege waived confidentiality, Bayhi could not then raise
that same privilege to protect himself.261
The Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case to the district court to
establish whether the communications between Mayeux and Bayhi were
“confessions per se”—confessions heard within the context of the
sacrament of Confession—and if there were any conversations outside of
the confessional that would have mandated Bayhi to report allegations of
abuse as a mandatory reporter.262 The Diocese then filed a petition for a writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, arguing that a factfinder
should not be allowed to determine whether certain conversations are
confessions per se.263 The Diocese argued that this discretion “allows the
state to override the Catholic religion’s own determination of what its beliefs
and practices require and destroys the sacred seal of confession in the
process.”264 The Diocese stated that this issue “cuts to the core of the
Catholic faith, and for a civil court to inquire as to whether a factual situation
establishes the sacrament of confession is a clear and unfettered violation of
the Establishment Clause of the Constitution of the United States.”265 In
January 2015, the Supreme Court denied the writ, leaving the case back in
state district court.266
On remand, Judge Mike Caldwell conducted a pre-trial evidentiary
hearing in which Bayhi testified that revealing a sacramental confession

258. Joe Gyan, Jr., Judge rules priests not required to report alleged wrongdoing
if learned during confession, ADVOCATE (Feb. 28, 2016), http://www.theadvo
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would result in his excommunication from the Catholic Church.267
Caldwell subsequently ruled that Children’s Code article 609(A)(1),
which states that a mandatory reporter must report suspected child abuse
regardless of privilege, violated Bayhi’s constitutional right to Free
Exercise under the Louisiana Constitution.268 Citing Louisiana’s
Preservation of Religious Freedom Act,269 Caldwell declared that
Louisiana unquestionably has a compelling interest in protecting children
from abuse but that the article he struck down was not the least restrictive
way to accomplish this goal.270 Caldwell reiterated the Louisiana Supreme
Court’s order that a jury must determine whether a confession per se actually
took place and whether the priest’s duty to report had been triggered.271 He
also declared that if a jury found that Bayhi obtained knowledge of
Mayeux’s abuse within a confession per se, Mayeux’s attorneys may not
argue that the priest had a legal duty to report the allegations.272
In light of the constitutional issue at stake, Caldwell’s ruling to strike
down article 609(A)(1) was appealed directly to the Louisiana Supreme
Court.273 The Court ruled that Caldwell’s declaration of unconstitutionality
was premature because the scope of Bayhi’s duty to report depended upon
the jury’s factual determination of whether the priest learned the abuse
allegations exclusively within a sacramental confession or whether he
gained knowledge of the abuse outside the confessional.274 The Court
decided that constitutional analysis of the law was unnecessary until the
267. Gyan, Jr., supra note 258.
268. Id. Article I, section 8 of the Louisiana Constitution states: “No law shall
be enacted respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the Free Exercise
thereof.” LA. CONST. art. I, § 8.
269. The Preservation of Religious Freedom Act states:
Government shall not substantially burden a person’s exercise of
religion, even if the burden results from a facially neutral rule or a rule
of general applicability, unless it demonstrates that application of the
burden to the person is both: (1) In furtherance of a compelling
governmental interest. (2) The least restrictive means of furthering that
compelling governmental interest.
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jury made such a finding.275 Finally, the Court conclusively stated that a
priest is not considered a mandatory reporter while administering a
sacramental confession because the tenets of the Catholic Church dictate
that priests are bound by religious duty to keep these communications
confidential.276
C. Charlet Brings out the Dark Side of the Confessional Privilege
Under Louisiana’s Preservation of Religious Freedom Act, the state
must burden Free Exercise in the least restrictive way necessary to carry
out its compelling interest.277 The sequence of events in Charlet exhibits
how confessional shields can result in the failure to adequately pursue
identification and prevention of child abuse. Bayhi’s reported concealment
of abuse and alleged insistence that Mayeux deal with the problem herself
and “sweep [the abuse] under the floor” had the opposite result of the
legislation’s intended goal.278 Because Bayhi allegedly refrained from
reporting, law enforcement and Mayeux’s parents remained unaware of
the abuse long enough for Charlet’s actions against Mayeux to persist and
escalate.279
Bayhi’s alleged actions—or more appropriately, inactions—are
reminiscent of the misguided leadership of the Archdiocese of Boston in
the Spotlight scandal—in which local Church authorities concealed the
serial sexual abuse of several priests, allowing the priests to continue
harming children in various church parishes for decades.280 Mayeux’s
petition in the Charlet lawsuit states that her abuse continued and
worsened following Bayhi’s failure to report.281 In fact, the most horrific
instance of abuse alleged in Mayeux’s petition—when Mayeux confronted
Charlet in his private office only to be forced onto a sofa and aggressively
kissed and groped—occurred after Mayeux’s reported confessions to
Bayhi.282
Furthermore, Mayeux testified in her deposition that she did not
comprehend the nature of the sacrament of Confession and did not desire
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for Bayhi to keep the communication a secret.283 Charlet demonstrates
how children cannot be expected to understand the intricacies of state law
and canon law and may have no idea that a priest has both a clerical duty
to refrain from reporting and a legal avenue to support his refusal to
report.284
Charlet also has entangled Louisiana courts in the interpretation of
religious doctrine by delegating to the jury the role of determining whether
confessions per se occurred between Bayhi and Mayeux.285 If the law
required clergy to report abuse regardless of church doctrine, there would
be no need for courts to concern themselves with the particulars of canon
law; rather, the only inquiry would be whether a clergy member had
knowledge of ongoing or imminent child abuse and, if so, whether he
willfully refrained from reporting the information to the authorities.286 If
the privilege were abrogated, the classification of the confession in Charlet
under the doctrines of Catholicism would be irrelevant. Finally, abrogation
of the privilege could still fulfill the Preservation of Religious Freedom
Act’s narrow tailoring requirement because the Children’s Code only
compels reporting if the mandatory reporter has reason to believe the
child’s well-being is in immediate danger.287
D. The Dilemma of Forcing a Catholic Priest to Reveal a Private
Confession
The Catholic Church’s principal argument for maintaining the clergypenitent privilege goes to the very existence of Confession: the sacrament
would be rendered useless if the element of secrecy were jeopardized.288
In Philips, the court summed up these fears by observing that if not for the
“strict and perpetual silence” of the sacrament, Confession would be
“wholly neglected and abandoned.”289 The court further noted that no
sinner would possess the willingness to divulge his deepest and most

283. Heidi Kinchen, U.S. Supreme Court Allows Lawsuit to Continue against
Baton Rouge Priest over Claim Parishioner Kissed, Fondled Teen: Supreme Court
Passes on Confession Issue, ADVOCATE (Jan. 25, 2015), http://www.theadvo
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2017]

COMMENT

305

shameful secrets to a clergy member at full liberty to disclose this
information.290
Now that the Louisiana Supreme Court has declared Mayeux free to
testify about her own confession, Bayhi faces a dilemma. Though Mayeux’s
attorney clarified that he does not plan on calling Bayhi as a witness at trial,
the situation presents a complicated scenario of divided loyalties.291 If Bayhi
were called to testify, the first problem he would face is the choice between
his civic duty to speak truthfully and comprehensively on the witness stand
and his religious duty to remain silent. If Bayhi refuses to break the seal of
confession, he could be held in contempt of court for failure to cooperate as
a witness.292
Bayhi additionally faces a choice between preservation of self and
preservation of the seal of confession. If Bayhi refuses to testify on his own
behalf, the jury will be left with only Mayeux’s version of events.293 If her
testimony is convincing, the jury may render a costly verdict against Bayhi
and the Diocese. Absent the religious barrier to testifying, Bayhi likely
would benefit from taking the witness stand to give his side of the story
and contest Mayeux’s accusations before the jury. When the case goes to
trial and Mayeux takes the witness stand, Bayhi will be situated in “the
legally untenable position of having to accept her version of events or
break the seal and face automatic excommunication.”294 Bayhi’s mandate
to remain silent ties his hands and leaves him at the jury’s mercy without
a viable means to defend himself.295
Despite the inequitable situation, the Diocese stated that in the event
Bayhi were compelled to testify, he would accept court-imposed
punishment rather than violate the seal of confession.296 If the hardline
stance of Bayhi and the Diocese are any indication, abrogation of the
clergy-penitent privilege—though constitutionally sound—will do little to
further the compelling state interest of protecting children. As long as
Catholic doctrine deems the confessional seal absolute, no drafting of the
290. Id.
291. Gyan, Jr., supra note 258.
292. Thomas Reese, Seal of Confession on the Court Docket, NAT’L CATHOLIC
REPORTER (Feb. 13, 2015), https://www.ncronline.org/blogs/faith-and-justice/sealconfession-court-docket [https://perma.cc/56SR-V4W7].
293. See Julie Love Taylor, Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet: A Threat to the
Sanctity of Catholic Confession?, LA. L. REV.: LAGNIAPPE (Oct. 22, 2014),
https://lawreview.law.lsu.edu/2014/10/22/parents-of-minor-child-v-charlet-a-threatto-the-sanctity-of-catholic-confession/ [https://perma.cc/5SW7-VE5S].
294. Reese, supra note 292.
295. See Taylor, supra note 293.
296. CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, supra note 16.
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law will compel priests—at least the priests that comply strictly with canon
law—to break confidence and report information learned during Confession,
even at the risk of civil liability or criminal punishment.297
E. Carrying out Compelling State Interests While Maintaining
Sacramental Integrity
Charlet is just another flashpoint in the Catholic Church’s history of
failure to address adequately the epidemic of sexual abuse of children. The
interpretation of the confessional seal as an ironclad doctrine of
confidentiality acts as a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to the
reporting of abuse allegations heard within the confessional. A closer look
at the text of canon law and increased efforts within the Catholic Church
to train priests in dealing with abuse, however, may allow for the
furthering of compelling state interests while maintaining the integrity of
the sacrament of Confession.
1. Penitent Waiver of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that Mayeux’s desire to testify
about her confession constitutes a valid waiver of the clergy-penitent
privilege despite the objections of Bayhi and the Diocese.298 The court
based its decision on the Code of Evidence which states that the penitent,
not the clergy member, holds the privilege.299 A penitent’s waiver of
privilege may be valid under the Catholic Church’s understanding of the
seal of confession as well.300
Under canon law, “[t]he sacramental seal is inviolable; therefore it is
absolutely forbidden for a confessor to betray in any way a penitent in
words or in any manner and for any reason.”301 Canon law states that a
priest must not betray the sinner, but if the penitent waives the seal of
confession and desires to testify about her confession, the potential for
betrayal is no longer present. Canon law also provides that “[a] confessor
is prohibited completely from using knowledge acquired from confession
to the detriment of the penitent . . . .”302 If Bayhi testified about Mayeux’s
confession he would not cause her any harm; on the contrary, any
297. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1.
298. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177, 1180 (La. 2014).
299. LA. CODE EVID. art. 511 (2017).
300. Dexter S. Brewer, The Right of a Penitent to Release the Confessor from the
Seal: Considerations in Canon Law and American Law, 54 JURIST 424, 454 (1994).
301. 1983 CODE c.983, § 1 (emphasis added).
302. Id. at c.984, § 1 (emphasis added).
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information he could offer about the alleged abuse could only aid Mayeux
and her lawyers in cross-examination and give the jury a more complete
body of testimony for deliberation purposes.
Thomas Reese, a canonist and Jesuit priest, argues that “the weight of
theological and canonical opinion supports the right of penitents to allow
their confessor to reveal what they told him in confession.”303 According
to Reese, many canonists believe clergy should be permitted to testify if a
penitent desires to openly discuss his or her confession.304 Father Dexter
Brewer, a theological scholar, also addressed the validity of penitent
waiver:
The seal [of confession] has a very definite purpose. When the
reasons for the seal—i.e., protection of the penitent from betrayal and
protection of the sacrament and the faithful from scandal—dissipate
because of the penitent’s release, then the seal no longer presents a
barrier to the priest’s extra-sacramental communication.305
Now that Mayeux has publicly declared her sexual abuse by voluntarily
filing a lawsuit and electing to testify, the element of confidentiality that
the seal of confession is designed to protect no longer exists and Bayhi
should thus be free to speak openly about the confessions.
Penitent waiver of the clergy-penitent privilege makes logical sense if
a victim confides in a priest. The reasoning is ineffectual, however, if the
abuser confesses his actions because, unless the abuser voluntarily asks
the priest to report the crimes, a priest who incriminates his own penitent
surely brings about detriment and betrayal.306 Consequently, much like the
states weigh compelling interests against Free Exercise violations,
Catholic leaders ultimately may need to evaluate whether prevention of
child abuse and protection of victims justifies a more flexible
interpretation of the seal of confession in these specific circumstances.
The Church should weigh its own history of sexual abuse in
reconsidering its stance. These scandals not only harm the reputation of
the Church, they also cost a great deal of money. A study performed by
the National Catholic Reporter found that over the past 65 years the
Catholic Church in the United States incurred almost four billion dollars

303.
304.
305.
306.

Reese, supra note 292.
Jenkins, supra note 89.
Brewer, supra note 300, at 454.
See 1983 CODE c.983, § 1; c.984, § 1.
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in costs arising out of lawsuits alleging the abuse of children by priests.307
This figure incorporates amounts spent on litigation and settlements as
well as money spent on training and background checks for priests and
therapy for victims of abuse.308 Though Charlet does not involve an
abusive priest, Bayhi’s supposed failure to disclose Mayeux’s abuse has
the potential to inflict a sizeable financial toll on the Church, in light of the
Mayeuxs’ naming of the Diocese as a co-defendant in the lawsuit.309 Based
on the already substantial amount spent on suits alleging the abuse of
children by priests, the Church should be wary of positioning itself for a new
round of high-profile, high-dollar litigation against priests refusing to report
child abuse. Reinterpreting canon law to prioritize child protection over
absolute confidentiality would eliminate the threat of excommunication, thus
encouraging priests to report any suspicions of child abuse heard in the
confessional. Such a policy would also emphasize a commitment to protection
of the Church’s most vulnerable members.
2. Institutional Changes Within the Priesthood to Encourage
Reporting of Abuse
According to Father Peter Finney III of the Archdiocese of New
Orleans, Catholic leadership is unlikely to create caveats in canon law for
the protection of minors.310 If the Church declines to reinterpret the
confessional seal, it still can strive to better respond to allegations of sexual
abuse within the confessional. Finney noted that in order to take a more
active role, priests first need to comprehend the gravity of abuse situations
and the reluctance of child victims to come forward.311 Priests also must
be trained to strongly urge penitents to report their abuse to the authorities
and avoid discouraging or shaming victims into silence, the scenario
alleged in Charlet.312 Finney stated that of all the training priests receive
for administering Confession, “the most important skill is to see what is
confessed through the eyes of the penitent.”313 Finney said that priests must
307. Jack & Diane Ruhl, NCR Research: Costs of Sex Abuse Crisis to US Church
Underestimated, NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.ncronline
.org/news/accountability/ncr-research-costs-sex-abuse-crisis-us-church-underesti
mated [https://perma.cc/M5E8-QGKG].
308. Id.
309. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 1177, 1178 (La. 2014).
310. E-mail from Fr. Peter Finney III, Adm’r, St. Rita Catholic Church in New
Orleans, LA, to author (Jan. 17, 2017, 18:45 CST) (on file with author).
311. Id.
312. Parents of Minor Child v. Charlet, 135 So. 3d 724, 726 (La. Ct. App. 2013).
313. Finney, supra note 310.
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treat the information entrusted to them with the utmost seriousness and take
every effort to emphasize the magnitude of abusive situations to penitents
reluctant to come forward.314
Finney stated that priests also can attempt to obtain a penitent’s consent
to engage in a conversation outside of the confessional while making
absolutely clear the nature of the seal of confession and additionally
addressing the priest’s need to leave the realm of absolute confidentiality to
provide proper assistance.315 If the penitent agrees, Finney said a priest
would need to establish the facts of abuse independently and cannot supply
them from the information learned in the confessional.316 Finney
acknowledged that the priest treads a fine line here, but clergy need not be
completely passive in the conversation and can ask questions appropriate to
any normal counseling meeting.317
Finally, priests can detect signs of abuse outside of the confessional to
gain knowledge that will trigger their duty to report and avoid breaking the
seal of Confession.318 Finney reiterated that priests can only use information
learned outside of the confessional but stated that priests have a moral duty as
“invested observers” to ensure that all church-related encounters are healthy
and safe.319 Thus, if a priest noticed evidence of abuse in his daily ministry,
he could start asking questions.320 In the event a person accuses the priest of
using his confessional knowledge to investigate further, the priest must
strongly emphasize that his outside observations alone initiated the
concern.321 If Catholic priests take note of Finney’s suggestions to take a
less passive and more proactive role in observing signs of child abuse, the
Charlet scenario can be avoided in the future.322 His advice also
314. Id.
315. Id.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. Id.
320. Id.
321. Id.
322. Mayeux v. Charlet Update: On September 27, 2017, Judge Mike Caldwell
ruled that a jury cannot consider what Rebecca Mayeux told Father Jeff Bayhi
inside the confessional. According to Caldwell, the determination of whether or
not a confession per se occurred is an interpretation of church law that is outside
the jurisdiction of civil courts. Furthermore, Caldwell noted that courts cannot
interfere in the tenets of the Catholic Church. Mayeux’s attorney, Brian Abels,
likely will seek review of Caldwell’s decision with the Louisiana First Circuit
Court of Appeal. See Joe Gyan, Jr., Baton Rouge judge: Court doesn’t have
jurisdiction over Catholic Church confessional issue, ADVOCATE (Sept. 27, 2017,
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demonstrates that there is in fact a way for priests to carry out their roles
as mandatory reporters in a robust manner, while still maintaining the
integrity of the seal of confession.
CONCLUSION
Abrogation of the clergy-penitent privilege in the context of
confidential communications is constitutional because the compelling
state interest of protecting children outweighs the narrow infringement
upon the religious rights of clergy. A change in the law may have only a
limited effect on Catholicism as long as priests continue to place canon
law ahead of their legal duty to report. Imposing legal accountability on
priests would send a strong message to the Catholic Church that perhaps
it should reevaluate its absolute stance on the seal of confession. If the
Church declines to reassess established doctrines of confidentiality,
however, it must still make every effort to train its priests to discover
information related to abuse outside of Confession that will trigger their
duty to report and to encourage suspected victims of abuse to engage in
extra-sacramental communications.
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